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2nd Nature and Education (McDowell)

I just read McDowell "Mind and World", and to have a critical (perhaps even a comprehension) questions. And then another question immediately ahead ...
A basic problem with the auseindandersetzt to McD's, how can the "logical space of reasons" and the "logical space of nature" and share each other. Ultimately, it's about whether our normative way of speaking (namely rationality, knowledge and content - beliefs can be true or false, so there are standards that meet a conviction must be true) to our descriptive speech, with which we nature in the natural sciences describe can be attributed. (Sorry for the monster of sentence read, too much McD.)
So my first ask yourself: Is it really McDowell only different ways to describe the world to capture /, or has deeper metaphysical claims?

McDowell tried both logical spaces to be reconciled by claiming that both are of the nature of space and the space of reasons part of nature. What he "realm of law", namely the call, which falls under the laws of nature and is described by science does not alone from nature. (Anti-Physikalismus!) This is still what McD called "2nd Nature" and "education" - namely, a part of our human Nature, which is only developed through education. Here is a passage: "Our education actualize some of the potentialities we are born with; not we do have to suppose it introduces a non-animal ingredient into our constitution ... the space of reasons [+ conceptual skills] ... can be within the framework Which meaning comes into view only because our eyes can be opened to it by education, Which is an element in the normal coming to maturity of the kind of animal we are. " (P.88, 1996 edition)
My question: Is this second nature of man will ultimately not something that can also by nature a la science be explained? I would argue that our cultural practice, to the development of conceptual Skills leads, evolutionarily explainable and therefore also attributable to the natural sciences. If that's true, but McDowell is part of the store "soon Naturalists" against which he applies himself. Does anyone
statements or objections to my question?
Eva

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now finally anonymous comments

Hello,
after a few complaints about the complicated registration process, I have decided, at least tentatively, to allow comments by anyone. Those who want to vent to a published here can post a comment that is now so easy to do so.
For their own posts, however you must still register with me. Despite these circumstances I am of course very much in favor , each of a question, problem, or a steep proposition this one be published.
So then a lot of fun,
Eva

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qualia and thoughts

Last Post followed by a further question: Do we
as the 'thoughts' just as' occurent beliefs' or more broadly as' currently instantiated attitudes to propositional contents '. So I think even "Now it's March."
My impression is that most philosophers (and especially the representationalist) assume that I can have this idea, without it being somehow to have him. The idea is not necessarily associated with qualia. If I'm not mistaken, but takes David Chalmers at least the opposite: namely, that it is always somehow a 'occurent was' to have.

I would intuitively agree with Chalmers feels When I think about something, no matter what it is, then the in some way. The feel of even relatively similar to what is present with me when I have something perceive. How are we going: I think just the month of March, but it's somehow not think to let him?
Actually, I would rather the distinction between thoughts and feelings maintained (namely, that the latter necessarily associated with the former Qualia, is not) - ie: does anyone know a way, as my intuition could be invalidated?

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convictions and Philo thought

A question of terminology:
appear in the English literature to the philosophy of mind as a contrast term to 'experience' alternately (and for me not clearly distinguishable) 'thought' and 'belief' on. I have two theories about where the difference between thought could / thoughts and was lying / convictions: first

Convictions are not necessarily instantiated thoughts. I can have such a conviction, that is March now, without actually I just thought in my head. For example, it could be that I think just because I'm hungry (and I 'hear say' this in my head). Nevertheless, I have a background conviction that is now March, only This is not convinced (required) instantiates concrete. The difference here is so into something like 'MRP vs. instantiated '.

second Convictions are a subspecies of thoughts. To think it in not only the conviction that now is March, but also the hope that is March now, the in-Recital-pulling, that just is March, or doubting, that just is March. Thought would therefore be roughly synonymous to propositional attitudes.

A third possibility is a combination of both: Thoughts are just instantiated propositional attitudes, of which there are several subspecies, such as convictions or instantiated instantiated doubt.

Hat anyone of you more information or intuitions, how to understand the best?

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blog

Hi everyone, yesterday I
an indignant e-mail received, the other philosophical about my first blog (German) has been on the internet aware that I will not deprive you.
So: "http://www.philobar.blogspot.com/", "http://web115.can20.de/blogpress/", "http://www.siggibecker.de/blog/. Moreover, one of our co-panelists own philosophical blog, which is to be mentioned here also: http://philoblog.de.

was second defendant in that one must register if you want to participate in discussions on this blog. I thought that was actually quite a good idea to make it a little cozy family remains. On the other hand, it is stupid if people do not therefore give helpful comments, because they find it too stressful to sign up. What do you think?
Eva

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Why do we need abstract objects?

As already posted below, I try klarzuwerden what is meant by "content" of mental states. Therefore, I try to understand what are propositions that are expressed as their content like. To understand what propositions, I try to understand what are abstract objects - because propositions are considered as abstract objects like.

I find it intuitively plausible to assume first that there is something else than that "tangible" things that touch you see, etc., may or parts that make up these things. It can of course be other items that we do not because of our perception of limitations to exercise, so it's perhaps better to speak here of objects that exist in space and time. (Ontological remark). I also find it implausible that we could have knowledge of such non-tangible items. How does it work because if we do not use these objects in (causal, spatial, temporal) contact interaction or the like can occur? (Epistemic comment)

It is nice and also from a systematic perspective helpful if you can talk about abstract objects. (For example, if our modal language by means of possible worlds that exist in maximally consistent sets of propositions explains.) I got the impression that many philosophers consider abstract objects as more than a useful tool. So my question is: we need to seriously argue that there are abstract objects? If so, what are the reasons? Why are abstract objects to be more than a useful fiction?

As always grateful for helpful comments
Eva

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transparency

And a philosophical contribution ...
According to Moore's argument are the Qualia transparency about the phenomenal character of perceptions transparent. That is, if I look as the blue sea, while trying to concentrate on the blue qualia my perception, I look (metaphorically speaking) by the end Qualia through and concentrate on the blue of the sea, my perception represented. When the perceptions

all very plausible (I think). But finally, I was confronted with the question of how it is with pain. Other examples would be moods, feelings, or the like.
Examples: If I hear a song the qualia of my auditory perception transparent? When I feel a sharp pain in my left shoulder blade, the sensation of qualia are transparent? If I'm scared, this feeling is transparent?

The question naturally arises, first and foremost the representationalist, yes, used the transparency of the argument as an argument for his thesis that qualia are our feelings with their representational content identical.
What do you think?

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trip to the phonetics

at the meeting so the matter was clarified how to "Alex Byrne" pronounce (namely Böörn with English "r"), and also how to "Fregean content" expresses, namely about Fregia with emphasis on the first "e".
What I am still not clear is how to "Chalmers" pronounce: Intuitively, I would say yes Chahhmers ", but I've also heard" Challlmers.
Does anyone know more?
Eva

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Chalmers and dinosaurs

As I understand Chalmers is one of the problems that a reduction of phenomenal consciousness to physical facts stand in the way this: Even if I know all of the physical world reveals itself to me this does not yet why, for example, the pain in my foot feels so and so.
In contrast, according to Chalmers are non-phenomenal facts. If I know anything about the underlying micro-physical and functional facts, then I know for example why (or that?) Water behaves so and so.
Because of this difference can be facts about water facts about H 2 reduce O; facts about consciousness can, however, as not to reduce facts about the brain.

My objection: Even with physical facts, we are not always able to conclude, from our complete knowledge of basic facts on more facts. An example of this morning I read in the Süddeutsche. Here's the link: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/, wl1/wissen/artikel/112/72040 /
The headline reads: ".. Run, Dino, run researchers try to understand, how did the dinosaurs moved, as the exact movements were, but will probably remain a mystery."
The thesis of the article is that we will never know exactly how the exactly dinosaurs are gone (what position, which movements, what speed, etc.), even though we are the skeletons, fossils, computer simulations, and more at our disposal. Although we can rule out various hypotheses, such as dinosaurs are gone, but still we can not just pick out a movement and say, this is the right one.

I give that we have no complete knowledge about dinosaurs. But we have no complete knowledge about the brain. And even if we (in addition to the current dinosaurs themselves) would have all the information one could then claim not still believe that we do not know how accurate they are wrong? Should we then say that the facts are on motion dinosaur in non-physical facts?