convictions and Philo thought
A question of terminology:
appear in the English literature to the philosophy of mind as a contrast term to 'experience' alternately (and for me not clearly distinguishable) 'thought' and 'belief' on. I have two theories about where the difference between thought could / thoughts and was lying / convictions: first
Convictions are not necessarily instantiated thoughts. I can have such a conviction, that is March now, without actually I just thought in my head. For example, it could be that I think just because I'm hungry (and I 'hear say' this in my head). Nevertheless, I have a background conviction that is now March, only This is not convinced (required) instantiates concrete. The difference here is so into something like 'MRP vs. instantiated '.
second Convictions are a subspecies of thoughts. To think it in not only the conviction that now is March, but also the hope that is March now, the in-Recital-pulling, that just is March, or doubting, that just is March. Thought would therefore be roughly synonymous to propositional attitudes.
A third possibility is a combination of both: Thoughts are just instantiated propositional attitudes, of which there are several subspecies, such as convictions or instantiated instantiated doubt.
Hat anyone of you more information or intuitions, how to understand the best?
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