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Proposal of 'politics weekly' Frege's criterion

"How about having one, maybe old but still interesting for me now question whether a conviction if it is subject to any influence of a feeling, once regarded as a moral attitude is?
If therefore the conviction that only a preliminary stage in moral learning process?"

above can discuss we are happy, only you have to explain exactly what you mean! An example might be quite helpful. I am a bit confused - normally one knows just the opposite, namely Kant's assertion that, once emotions come into play, and morality has an end immediately. And what about my conviction: in the refrigerator, there is a beer when they under the influence I feel I have a beer saubock come? If this is to fall under your principle, then the first conviction would be morally, but what it is not likely.

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known, it is possible that Otto (while he viewed the morning sky, Venus) but think: This is the morning star , but not: That's the Abene. Although both terms have the same reference, namely Venus, but since Otto does not know that Evening Star = Morning Star, you can not just replace one term by the other. Religious contexts are intensional contexts.
One can also establish the rule ("Frege's criterion): If possible

is that a person who disposes over the terms F and G believes that something is F, but that it is not G, F and G are two different concepts.

Under this rule Abener and Morgenstern different terms, because Otto believes that this is because the morning star, but not the evening star (though he disposes over two terms).

In an article by Jeff Speaks about non-conceptual content (here: www.arts.mcgill.ca / philo / speaks / papers / nonconceptual penultimate.pdf) is asserted in an aside that it is possible that F and G Frege likely to satisfy, but still two different concepts. That's according Speaks always the case when There are two synonyms in a language.
Speaks example, the English expressions "ketchup" and (both hot ketchup) "catsup" Someone can understand what the meaning of both expressions, without knowing that they are synonymous. Then he can believe that this is because catsup, but not ketchup. Nevertheless are ketchup and catsup synonymous, that is, it's the same concept that is only just brought by different words to express.

Conclusion: Frege's criterion does not apply for anything you can think or believe - sometimes someone has the concept F and G believes that something is F and G, but still are F and G no different concepts.

runs the argument (I think) to the question also, as related notions and expressions, or thinking, and language - Speaks' position is based on the assumption that language can sometimes differ Fine, as thinking - namely when two expressions take the same concept expressed . (. Could be similar even for different languages to say - for example, that the words 'mother' and 'mother' the same term to express) the one hand I think it's quite reasonable, on the other hand, I tend to say however, that there are two different concepts ketchup and catsup there, just can not believe someone that does not equal ketchup catsup is.

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suggestions?

unfortunately I'm just very uncreative when it comes to exciting new topics for discussion. I am working on it though!
If someone of you can think what, what should be discussed urgently, tell me just know!
Eva

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changes in the working world of the philosophers?

I found an interesting post that deals with how and whether the behavior of professional philosophers in the United States over the last decades has changed, in particular their commitment and dedication to the universities and in the cities , in which they teach.
I have little idea of what it actually is and was in Germany. Do we have similar developments?

Here is the post

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perception and thought

What really distinguishes thoughts / beliefs and perceptions of other sensations? The Nonkonzeptualist says that both have a different type of content (which is conceptually of thought that is not of sensations-term). The conceptualist expressed (as far as I know) not to do so. What could really McDowell say about why they are different?
And what one would intuitively give in response to distinguish why both? Somehow hangs together even with the phenomenal dimension of sensations. On the other hand, there are also enough philosophers who claim that thoughts have a phenomenal dimension.

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vs. agnosticism. Atheism and skepticism

My friend and I discuss the subject more often times what is actually the more rational position: atheism or agnosticism.

The argument for atheism:
There are all sorts of arguments that there is no God, as the theodicy. In addition, we are atheists in respect of all to touch all possible gods (Odin, Vishnu, Aphrodite, ...) - and do not have better reasons not to believe in these gods, as we have not to believe in the Christian God. Things you once could only explain with the help of God, can explain today without, for example, by evolution. One could argue for the existence of a God that would explain a Schoepfergott, why the universe came into being at all. (It would have as it were a cause for the Big Bang.) But actually it moves with this 'statement' the question of cause only a step backwards (What is the reason that there is a God?) And do pretty significant additional metaphysical assumptions to make. So it is most rational to assume that there is no god at all.

argument for agnosticism:
There is actually no viable is sufficient proof that God exists. If one looks at the world, can at least by omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly well recognize much. The theory of evolution rid us of the assumption that there must be a God to tell us. But after all, the adoption of a Schoepfergottes the advantage that we have an explanation as to why at all it all started. Although the moves the question of why only a step backwards, but still! Despite additional metaphysical ballast (in the form of a god) theism is here is not (much) worse off than atheism. So it is most rational, to the question of whether there is a God, not at all defined. Maybe it's a bit more likely that there is none, but you can somehow not really comment.

What do you say?

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contextualism

Let's start with the following sentence I know, "I have hands."
The skeptic says that I do not that I have hands. Reason: The possibility exists that I am a brain in a tank and have no hands. Computer to send my brain electrical impulses that I remind of a world outside, including that I have hands. Since I dismiss this possibility with my evidence can not (which are in the brain in a vat-hair situation as well as in the situation with a real external world), I can not know for sure that I have hands.

the contextualist reply: If I'm the skeptic attention to the brain in a vat scenario makes, I actually do not know that I have hands. Similarly in all other situations in which someone submits doubts about our knowledge of the outside world. If I could but nobody is skeptical scenario calls to mind, I know very well that I have hands. The reason for this is because the standards change with the context in terms of what opportunities I can be exclude. If put forward in a context error possibilities, I can dismiss this, if not argued in another context, this error possibilities, I can not exclude it, to have knowledge.

My objection (I assume a standard objection) against contextualism: I know I have hands, even if I just discussed in the philosophy seminar about the skepticism. Even if someone just told me very emphatically, everything that I could look just like right now, and I still could be a brain in a tank, does not change the fact that I know that I have hands. Contextualist has at most is correct in that I might lose my conviction that I have hands, if someone suggests all good enough. Then of course I know not everything that I have some (but my knowledge fails because of the lack of conviction, not on the lack of justification). But as long as I firmly insist on my opinion, I find it absurd that this view is suddenly no longer be justified, although it was still 5 minutes before.

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"The Spirit of Animals" The evil

I take this semester for Seminar about the spirit of the animals. From this you can in the near term and expect more about animals whose mental qualities or abilities. (We hold the seminar on the book 'The Spirit of the Animals, which last year by Perler and game was released.)

One of the big questions is of course the can, whether animals think. For example, can believe the dog who follows a cat does not see that it has climbed to the chestnut and barks instead the adjacent beech, that the cat is on the book? Known opponent of the thesis that animals can think, is Davidson. He claims, first, that we already own animals therefore can not attribute thoughts, because we in principle the content of their thoughts can not specify. We can not, because animals have no language. Second, we can attribute to animals any ideas, because whenever you can only attribute a whole network of beliefs, etc., and this would have to then belong convictions, the animals certainly do not have. (This all was out of my head, I hope I'm not very Davidson falsified.)

I think it is obvious that animals have no idea, formulated in language. For example, thinks the dog is certainly not, "I'm sure the cat is on the book!" But it might be that thoughts must be formulated not necessarily linguistically in order to have a content and therefore to count as a thought. It seems to me that is most plausible that some kind of mental representations are, which also can have (higher) animals and from a functional perspective, play a similar role as our linguistically structured thought. The dog would have a mental representation that is caused by the fact that he has seen the cat walking towards book (he has just not seen it yet then jumped on the chestnut.) These representations led to the book that he barks. If the dog, the cat will see it suddenly on the chestnut would, then it would in 'trigger' a different representation, and he would bark as the chestnut.

Any objections?