Let's start with the following sentence I know, "I have hands."
The skeptic says that I do not that I have hands. Reason: The possibility exists that I am a brain in a tank and have no hands. Computer to send my brain electrical impulses that I remind of a world outside, including that I have hands. Since I dismiss this possibility with my evidence can not (which are in the brain in a vat-hair situation as well as in the situation with a real external world), I can not know for sure that I have hands.
the contextualist reply: If I'm the skeptic attention to the brain in a vat scenario makes, I actually do not know that I have hands. Similarly in all other situations in which someone submits doubts about our knowledge of the outside world. If I could but nobody is skeptical scenario calls to mind, I know very well that I have hands. The reason for this is because the standards change with the context in terms of what opportunities I can be exclude. If put forward in a context error possibilities, I can dismiss this, if not argued in another context, this error possibilities, I can not exclude it, to have knowledge.
My objection (I assume a standard objection) against contextualism: I know I have hands, even if I just discussed in the philosophy seminar about the skepticism. Even if someone just told me very emphatically, everything that I could look just like right now, and I still could be a brain in a tank, does not change the fact that I know that I have hands. Contextualist has at most is correct in that I might lose my conviction that I have hands, if someone suggests all good enough. Then of course I know not everything that I have some (but my knowledge fails because of the lack of conviction, not on the lack of justification). But as long as I firmly insist on my opinion, I find it absurd that this view is suddenly no longer be justified, although it was still 5 minutes before.
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