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Proposal of 'politics weekly' Frege's criterion

"How about having one, maybe old but still interesting for me now question whether a conviction if it is subject to any influence of a feeling, once regarded as a moral attitude is?
If therefore the conviction that only a preliminary stage in moral learning process?"

above can discuss we are happy, only you have to explain exactly what you mean! An example might be quite helpful. I am a bit confused - normally one knows just the opposite, namely Kant's assertion that, once emotions come into play, and morality has an end immediately. And what about my conviction: in the refrigerator, there is a beer when they under the influence I feel I have a beer saubock come? If this is to fall under your principle, then the first conviction would be morally, but what it is not likely.

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known, it is possible that Otto (while he viewed the morning sky, Venus) but think: This is the morning star , but not: That's the Abene. Although both terms have the same reference, namely Venus, but since Otto does not know that Evening Star = Morning Star, you can not just replace one term by the other. Religious contexts are intensional contexts.
One can also establish the rule ("Frege's criterion): If possible

is that a person who disposes over the terms F and G believes that something is F, but that it is not G, F and G are two different concepts.

Under this rule Abener and Morgenstern different terms, because Otto believes that this is because the morning star, but not the evening star (though he disposes over two terms).

In an article by Jeff Speaks about non-conceptual content (here: www.arts.mcgill.ca / philo / speaks / papers / nonconceptual penultimate.pdf) is asserted in an aside that it is possible that F and G Frege likely to satisfy, but still two different concepts. That's according Speaks always the case when There are two synonyms in a language.
Speaks example, the English expressions "ketchup" and (both hot ketchup) "catsup" Someone can understand what the meaning of both expressions, without knowing that they are synonymous. Then he can believe that this is because catsup, but not ketchup. Nevertheless are ketchup and catsup synonymous, that is, it's the same concept that is only just brought by different words to express.

Conclusion: Frege's criterion does not apply for anything you can think or believe - sometimes someone has the concept F and G believes that something is F and G, but still are F and G no different concepts.

runs the argument (I think) to the question also, as related notions and expressions, or thinking, and language - Speaks' position is based on the assumption that language can sometimes differ Fine, as thinking - namely when two expressions take the same concept expressed . (. Could be similar even for different languages to say - for example, that the words 'mother' and 'mother' the same term to express) the one hand I think it's quite reasonable, on the other hand, I tend to say however, that there are two different concepts ketchup and catsup there, just can not believe someone that does not equal ketchup catsup is.