order again to start a purely philosophical Post ...
Getti The problem is so well known and invertebrate: Getti shows that in some cases where we intuitively would admit no knowledge of a person, according to the definition of knowledge (= justified true belief) still would have to present knowledge. What is to be shown that the definition is not or is not sufficient.
For example, Otto has good reason to believe that his friend Hans owns a Ford. He has absolutely no reason to believe that his girlfriend Elke in Barcelona. For fun, he expressed the conviction: "Hans owns a Ford or Elke is in Barcelona. "Unfortunately, Hans has no Ford, but only runs with a borrowed Ford through the area. For this is Elke chance in Barcelona. The conviction is therefore justified and true, but still do not know Otto, that Hans owns a Ford or Elke is in Barcelona.
All Getti problem is based on the assumption that our concepts have a definition structure. It can be defined, which is knowledge, and who has the concept knowledge, has somehow (intuitively?) through the appropriate definition. Unfortunately, this understanding of the structure of terms is completely outdated. are currently popular the prototype theory and the theory-theory.
prototype theory: A term is not in a sufficient and necessary set of conditions as a definition, instead, only a few conditions must be met before a word is given. (For example, falls within the definition banana fruit, though perhaps one of the conditions for fruit also to hear that a fruit is round.)
theories theory: words such as theories - she explained her role in the connection with other related terms. (For example, apple a particular role in connection with fruit, pear or Golden Delicious ;. Then it is the concept)
Particularly in view of the problem getti I think it's obvious that there are not concepts in definitions. Then philosophical concept analysis may, however, not the fact, definitions (with the claim of necessary and sufficient) auszubuchstabieren.
The prize question: What then takes the place of the traditional expression analysis? What can it be said as a philosopher, if one wants to clarify what we mean by knowledge?
For an article about terms: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/
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