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contextualism

Let's start with the following sentence I know, "I have hands."
The skeptic says that I do not that I have hands. Reason: The possibility exists that I am a brain in a tank and have no hands. Computer to send my brain electrical impulses that I remind of a world outside, including that I have hands. Since I dismiss this possibility with my evidence can not (which are in the brain in a vat-hair situation as well as in the situation with a real external world), I can not know for sure that I have hands.

the contextualist reply: If I'm the skeptic attention to the brain in a vat scenario makes, I actually do not know that I have hands. Similarly in all other situations in which someone submits doubts about our knowledge of the outside world. If I could but nobody is skeptical scenario calls to mind, I know very well that I have hands. The reason for this is because the standards change with the context in terms of what opportunities I can be exclude. If put forward in a context error possibilities, I can dismiss this, if not argued in another context, this error possibilities, I can not exclude it, to have knowledge.

My objection (I assume a standard objection) against contextualism: I know I have hands, even if I just discussed in the philosophy seminar about the skepticism. Even if someone just told me very emphatically, everything that I could look just like right now, and I still could be a brain in a tank, does not change the fact that I know that I have hands. Contextualist has at most is correct in that I might lose my conviction that I have hands, if someone suggests all good enough. Then of course I know not everything that I have some (but my knowledge fails because of the lack of conviction, not on the lack of justification). But as long as I firmly insist on my opinion, I find it absurd that this view is suddenly no longer be justified, although it was still 5 minutes before.

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"The Spirit of Animals" The evil

I take this semester for Seminar about the spirit of the animals. From this you can in the near term and expect more about animals whose mental qualities or abilities. (We hold the seminar on the book 'The Spirit of the Animals, which last year by Perler and game was released.)

One of the big questions is of course the can, whether animals think. For example, can believe the dog who follows a cat does not see that it has climbed to the chestnut and barks instead the adjacent beech, that the cat is on the book? Known opponent of the thesis that animals can think, is Davidson. He claims, first, that we already own animals therefore can not attribute thoughts, because we in principle the content of their thoughts can not specify. We can not, because animals have no language. Second, we can attribute to animals any ideas, because whenever you can only attribute a whole network of beliefs, etc., and this would have to then belong convictions, the animals certainly do not have. (This all was out of my head, I hope I'm not very Davidson falsified.)

I think it is obvious that animals have no idea, formulated in language. For example, thinks the dog is certainly not, "I'm sure the cat is on the book!" But it might be that thoughts must be formulated not necessarily linguistically in order to have a content and therefore to count as a thought. It seems to me that is most plausible that some kind of mental representations are, which also can have (higher) animals and from a functional perspective, play a similar role as our linguistically structured thought. The dog would have a mental representation that is caused by the fact that he has seen the cat walking towards book (he has just not seen it yet then jumped on the chestnut.) These representations led to the book that he barks. If the dog, the cat will see it suddenly on the chestnut would, then it would in 'trigger' a different representation, and he would bark as the chestnut.

Any objections?